Bernie Kerik Analyzes the Uvalde Police Response
In this snippet, Kerik tells us what happened. I'm going to try to explain why it happened . . . . or at least provide one possible explanation.
Cops did the exact same thing at Columbine High School in 1999 and it's happened in several other mass shootings.
In fact . . . it's probably happened in EVERY mass shooting but we're not just totally aware of it. Here is the simple fact:
RESPONDING COPS WON'T ENGAGE THE SHOOTER DIRECTLY.
Instead of going in and killing the mass shooter, they "set up a perimeter and contain."
This is not unusual for men in combat.
Writer S.L.A. Marshall (aka "Slam Marshall") wrote about this after World War Two and had the stats to prove it:
This was later disputed and some claimed that Marshall had made the whole thing up. They said that in many units, men fired way too much. But as a result of Marshall's book the Army instituted new training methods and by Korea, Marshall noted that the percentage of men engaging had jumped to around 55%
But whether Marshall got it right or not, this wasn't the first time someone had noticed the hesitation of men in combat.
.A French army officer (Colonel Ardant du Piq, later killed in 1870 during the Franco-Prussian War) had written about the hesitation of men in danger. Du Piq noted that in previous wars, men had stood shoulder to shoulder and this kept them morally strong. But in "modern wars" men had to disperse and this made them have to face danger alone.
The same thing was noted in the American Civil War. Almost 25,000 muskets were recovered on the Gettysburg battlefield and many had more than one round loaded. In other words, a soldier had loaded a round and in his fear had loaded another one and sometimes many more. (Supposedly, one musket was found with 23 rounds loaded but this is now considered a wild exaggeration.)
And in "Pickett's Charge" many historians now believe that the charge failed because many Confederate soldiers lay down at the fences along Emmitsburg Road and refused to advance further.
Here's the bottom line.
Cops in "battle" are no different than "soldiers in battle." Furthermore, for many reasons, most police departments in America train their cops to wait for backup. They're supposed to establish a perimeter, contain and wait for SWAT to actually go in and kill the bad guy, or for negotiators to talk them out.
So if you are ever a victim in this kind of mass shooting . . . the overwhelming probability is that the cops will not rescue you in time.
I'll leave it there. Draw your own conclusions and plans . . . . . .
In this snippet, Kerik tells us what happened. I'm going to try to explain why it happened . . . . or at least provide one possible explanation.
Cops did the exact same thing at Columbine High School in 1999 and it's happened in several other mass shootings.
In fact . . . it's probably happened in EVERY mass shooting but we're not just totally aware of it. Here is the simple fact:
RESPONDING COPS WON'T ENGAGE THE SHOOTER DIRECTLY.
Instead of going in and killing the mass shooter, they "set up a perimeter and contain."
This is not unusual for men in combat.
Writer S.L.A. Marshall (aka "Slam Marshall") wrote about this after World War Two and had the stats to prove it:
In any given body of American infantry in combat, no more than one-fifth, and generally as few as 15 percent, had ever fired their weapons at an enemy, indeed ever fired their weapons at all. SOURCE MEN AGAINST FIRE
This was later disputed and some claimed that Marshall had made the whole thing up. They said that in many units, men fired way too much. But as a result of Marshall's book the Army instituted new training methods and by Korea, Marshall noted that the percentage of men engaging had jumped to around 55%
But whether Marshall got it right or not, this wasn't the first time someone had noticed the hesitation of men in combat.
.A French army officer (Colonel Ardant du Piq, later killed in 1870 during the Franco-Prussian War) had written about the hesitation of men in danger. Du Piq noted that in previous wars, men had stood shoulder to shoulder and this kept them morally strong. But in "modern wars" men had to disperse and this made them have to face danger alone.
"The soldier is unknown often to his closest companions. He loses them in the disorienting smoke and confusion of a battle which he is fighting, so to speak, on his own. Cohesion is no longer ensured by mutual observation." SOURCE BATTLE STUDIES
The same thing was noted in the American Civil War. Almost 25,000 muskets were recovered on the Gettysburg battlefield and many had more than one round loaded. In other words, a soldier had loaded a round and in his fear had loaded another one and sometimes many more. (Supposedly, one musket was found with 23 rounds loaded but this is now considered a wild exaggeration.)
And in "Pickett's Charge" many historians now believe that the charge failed because many Confederate soldiers lay down at the fences along Emmitsburg Road and refused to advance further.
Here's the bottom line.
Cops in "battle" are no different than "soldiers in battle." Furthermore, for many reasons, most police departments in America train their cops to wait for backup. They're supposed to establish a perimeter, contain and wait for SWAT to actually go in and kill the bad guy, or for negotiators to talk them out.
So if you are ever a victim in this kind of mass shooting . . . the overwhelming probability is that the cops will not rescue you in time.
I'll leave it there. Draw your own conclusions and plans . . . . . .
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